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The Freedom of Information Act and The Central
Intelligence Agency's Paper Chase: A Need for
Congressional Action to Maintain Essential
Secrecy for Intelligence Files While
Preserving the Public's Right to Know
Patrick E. Cole*
"Secrecy is the first essential in the affairs of the State."'
Since the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)2 was enacted in
1966, the price of accountability has been high for the Central Intel-
ligence Agency (CIA) and for other agencies that comprise the intel-
ligence community.3 Congress apparently overlooked the drawbacks
of establishing an "open house" policy for the government docu-
ments of intelligence organizations, and this oversight has resulted in
a clash of statutory duties. The National Security Act of 19474 re-
quires the CIA to collect foreign intelligence, and the Central Intelli-
gence Agency Act of 19495 requires the Director of Central
Intelligence to protect sources and methods of intelligence. 6 The
* A.B., University of Notre Dame; J.D., University of California (Los Angeles); candi-
date for M. Phil., Exeter University (England), 1982-83. Currently with Cole, Raywid &
Braverman, Washington, D.C. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and
not of the Central Intelligence Agency nor any other agency of the intelligence community.
1 Armand Jean du Plessis Richelieu (1585-1642), the French statesman and chief
minister to King Louis XIII.
2 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976). The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) is the chief federal
law mandating openness in government files. Originally passed in 1966 and amended in
1974, 1976, and 1978, the FOIA provides that "any person" has a legal right to see all
"agency records" except those exempted by subsection (b) of the Act.
3 The "intelligence community" refers to the group of federal agencies that collects and
disseminates intelligence for the United States government. The agencies include the CIA,
FBI, Department of Defense (Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines), Defense Intelligence
Agency, National Security Agency, Department of Treasury, Drug Enforcement Adminstra-
tion, Department of Energy, and State Department.
4 50 U.S.C. § 403(d) (1976). The Act provides (emphasis added): "[I]t shall be the duty
of the Agency . . .to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to national security, and provide for
the appropriate dissemination of such intelligence within the Government using where appro-
priate existing agencies and facilities. . ....
5 50 U.S.C. § 403(d)(3) (1976).
6 See 50 U.S.C. § 403(a) (1976). Under the Central Intelligence Agency charter the Di-
rector of Central Intelligence has two functions. First, he is the primary advisor to the Presi-
dent and the National Security Council on national foreign intelligence matters. Second, he
is the head of the CIA.
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FOIA, however, creates an administrative burden on the CIA and on
other agencies by draining their manpower resources to comply with
numerous information requests. The CIA claims that this burden
detracts from the agency's foreign intelligence mission.
Although the most sensitive documents can be exempted from
disclosure, public access to government documents has had a chilling
effect on agents and foreign intelligence services who provide infor-
mation to the U.S. government.7 The prospect of unintentional dis-
closure," which exists as long as CIA records are subject to the FOIA,
has led some allied intelligence services to stop assisting the United
States intelligence community. 9 This problem makes it difficult for
the Director of Central Intelligence to fulfill his statutory mandate.
Unless Congress further restricts the public scrutiny of intel-
ligence files, America's foreign intelligence mission will continue to
erode. Congress faces the challenge of granting relief to the agency
while preserving the public's right to know. Simple solutions will not
provide an effective remedy to this dilemma. Requiring a need to
know, 10 for example, will only lead those anxious to secure an intelli-
gence document to create a fictitious reason for requesting the
information.
To explore the problems confronting the intelligence commu-
nity, Part I of this article will examine the FOIA's purpose and un-
derlying policy, the CIA's duty to collect foreign intelligence, and the
Director of Central Intelligence's responsibility to keep foreign intel-
ligence secret. Part II will discuss the strengths and limitations of the
statutory exemptions frequently invoked to restrict the release of sen-
sitive information. Part III will explain why simple solutions do not
adequately prevent damaging access to intelligence files, and will dis-
cuss the proposal for which the CIA has lobbied and the efforts of the
Reagan Administration to curb the flow of sensitive information. Fi-
nally, this article will present a proposal that reckons the competing
interests of secrecy and openness to effectively restrict the release of
information that could damage important intelligence contacts.
I. The Origin of Freedom of Information
The practice of providing public access to information about
government activities reflects a policy of zealously protecting a free
7 See notes 44-49 infra and accompanying text.
8 See note 68 infra and accompanying text.
9 See note 48 infra and accompanying text.
10 See notes 131-32 inf/a and accompanying text.
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press. Statesmen like Thomas Jefferson believed that a free press was
indispensable to democracy. Jefferson stated:
The people are the only censors of their governors; and even their
errors will tend to keep those to the true principles of their institu-
tion. . . . The way to prevent these irregular interpositions of the
people, is to give them full information of their affairs through the
channel of the public papers, and to contrive that those papers
should penetrate the whole mass of the people. The basis of our
government being the opinion of the people the very first object
should be to keep that right; and were it left to me to decide
whether we should have a government without newspapers, or
newspapers without a government, I should not hesitate to prefer
the latter.' I
From this Jeffersonian principle emerged the idea that people have a
right to know about government affairs.
While the news media largely provided the accountability which
Jefferson had cherished, a new form of accountability between con-
stituents and bureaucracies was initiated with the passage of the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act (APA),12 the FOIA's predecessor. The
APA was enacted in part because of President Franklin D.
Roosevelt's fear that administrative agencies might evolve into a
fourth branch of government. Administrative agencies, he remarked,
performed not only administrative work, but also judicial work for
which there was no express constitutional provision.' 3 Some years
after the APA's passage, Congress learned that the Act was being
used to conceal information from the public. The APA contained
broad ambiguous language that could be interpreted to allow the
11 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Lieutenant Colonel Edward Carrington (January 16,
1787), reprinted in A JEFFERSON PROFILE As REVEALED IN His LETTERS 44 (S. Padover ed.
1956). James Madison made a similar observation about the consequences of a lack of public
information: "A popular Government, without popular information, or the means of acquir-
ing it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or, perhaps both. Knowledge will forever
govern ignorance: And a people who mean to be their own Governors, must arm themselves
with the power which knowledge gives." Letter from James Madison to W.T. Barry (August
4, 1822), reprinted in 9 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 103 (Hunt ed. 1910), quotedin EPA
v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 110-11 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting). For more views on the right to
know, see Note, Access to Government Information and the Classification Process-Is There a Right to
Know?, 17 N.Y.L.F. 814, 815-18 (1971). In Madison's view, the Constitution gave no author-
ity to Congress to exercise power over the press. See generally Horton, The Public's Right To
Know, 3 N.C. CENT. LJ. 123 (1972); Kutner, Freedom of Information: Due Process of the Right to
Know, 18 CATH. LAW. 50 (1972) (discussion of the right to know with analysis of Madison's
free speech concerns as written in his Federalist Papers); Note, The Constitutional Right to Know,
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 109 (1977).
12 Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946).
13 See H.R. REP. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1946 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 1195.
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withholding of information.' 4
The reflections of Jefferson' 5 and James Madison,' 6 and the
Congressional vision of an open government finally became federal
law when President Johnson signed the Freedom of Information Act
on July 4, 1966.7 The FOIA greatly increased public accountability
of bureaucracies. The Act requires agencies to disclose government
records by either publishing the documents,' 8 making them available
for inspection,1 9 or releasing the documents as requested. Congress
abandoned the APA's restriction that only a person who is properly
and directly concerned may request information. Instead, the FOIA
provides that "any person" could obtain public records.20 Congress
improved the old law's vague exceptions2' by providing nine clearly
defined exemptions.2 2 A citizen who disagrees with an agency's deci-
sion to exempt information from disclosure may appeal to a federal
14 H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 2419, 2421. Under § 3 of the Administrative Procedure Act, the government could
withhold information if the information is related to internal management of the agency, if
secrecy is required "in the public interest," or "for good cause found." The House reaction to
this was:
Neither in the [APA] nor its legislative history are these broad phrases defined, nor
is there a recognition of the basic right of any person-not just those special classes
"properly and directly concerned"--to gain access to the records of official Govern-
ment actions. Above all, there is no remedy available to a citizen who has been
wrongfully denied access to the Government's public records.
H.R. REP. No. 1497 at 6, 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 2422.
One of the main problems with the APA was that an agency decision to refuse to release
a requested document was a final decision. See Note, The Freedom of Information Act: Shredding
the Paper Curtain, 47 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 694, 696 (1973).
15 See note 11 supra and accompanying text.
16 See note 11 supra.
17 The Freedom of Information Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-554, 80 Stat. 383 (1966).
18 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2) (1976).
19 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1976).
20 Id Congress intended to provide for the widest disclosure possible.
21 See note 14 supra and accompanying text.
22 The FOIA provides: This section does not apply to matters that are-
(1) (A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order
to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and (B) are in
fact properly classified pursuant to such Executive order;
(2) related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency;
(3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than section 552b of
this title), provided that such statute (A) requires that the matters be withheld from
the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on the issue, or (B) establishes
[Vol. 58:350]
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district court.23
A. FOZA s Policy of Disclosure
Passage of the FOIA initiated a policy of disclosure, and only
specific exemptions would allow government agencies to withhold in-
formation. Although a citizen may request any document, the nine
statutory exemptions protect various types of information from dis-
closure. Six years after the FOIA was passed, Senator Edward Ken-
nedy felt compelled to clarify that the statute's primary goal was not
to exempt material from disclosure.
Congress' overriding concern in passing the Freedom of Informa-
tion Act-FOIA-was that disclosure of information be the general
rule, not the exception. The act reversed previous law and practice
in that it provided that all persons have equal rights of access and
that the burden be placed on government to justify refusal to dis-
close information, not the person requesting it. Finally, the act al-
lowed persons wrongfully denied access to documents the right to
seek injunctive relief in the courts.
24
The Supreme Court has similarly maintained that the FOIA requires
the broadest possible disclosure "to ensure an informed citizenry, vi-
tal to the functioning of a democratic society.
' 25
particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be with-
held;
(4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a
person and privileged or confidential;
(5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be
available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency;
(6) personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would
constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy;
(7) investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to
the extent that the production of such records would (A) interfere with enforcement
proceedings, (B) deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudica-
tion, (C) constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, (D) disclose the
identity of a confidential source. ..;
(8) contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition reports
prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for the regulation
or supervision of financial institutions; or
(9) geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, con-
cerning wells.
5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1976).
23 See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (1976).
24 Freedom of Information: Hearings on S. 1142 Before the Subcomm. on Intergovernmental Relations
of the Senate Comm. on theJudiciar, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. (1973).
25 NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 242 (1978). See also Department
of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 361 (1976); EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 79 (1973).
Other federal courts also apply this policy. See, e.g., Robbins Tire & Rubber Co. v. NLRB,
563 F.2d 724 (5th Cir. 1977), rev'd, 437 U.S. 214 (1978) (attempt to have the NLRB turn over
[December 1982]
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NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. 2 6 illustrates the FOIA's disclosure
policy. In Sears, the NLRB sought to set aside a federal district court
order directing the NLRB to release certain documents known as
"Advice Memoranda." The district court had ruled that the memo-
randa were expressions of legal and policy decisions already adopted
by the agency and constituted "final opinions" and "instructions to
staff that affect a member of the public," all of which could be dis-
closed under the FOIA.2 7 The Supreme Court declared that the
FOIA was "clearly intended to give any member of the public as
much right to disclosure as one with a special interest therein
.... "28 Accordingly, a person with no urgent need for the informa-
tion has as much right to request the information as one who is the
subject of the document.
29
To enhance the objective of informing the public about agency
action, the courts construe the Act broadly to encourage as much
disclosure as possible. The Supreme Court in EPA v. Mink30 ex-
plained that the reason for encouraging maximum disclosure was to
ensure that government officials would not shield information of
copies of written statements of all those witnesses who would be called to testify in an unfair
labor practice proceeding); Open America v. Watergate Special Prosecution Force, 547 F.2d
605 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (plaintiff requests documents relating to former acting FBI Director L.
Patrick Gray's involvement in the Watergate scandal); Charles River Park "A", Inc. v. HUD,
519 F.2d 935, 941 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (operators of a multi-family housing unit attempted to
enjoin HUD from disclosing financial information); Theriault v. United States, 503 F.2d 390
(9th Cir. 1974), on remand, 395 F. Supp. 637 (C.D. Cal. 1975) (widow of civilian Air Force
employee sought documents relating to her husband's death); LaMorte v. Mansfield, 438
F.2d 448 (2d Cir. 1971) (dispute over requested transcript of testimony); Nationwide Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Friedman, 451 F. Supp. 736 (D. Md. 1978) (government contractor attempts to
prevent disclosure of information); Stern v. Richardson, 367 F. Supp. 1316 (D.D.C. 1973)
(FBI documents related to counterintelligence did not fall under the exemptions).
26 421 U.S. 132 (1975). See also NLRB v. Hardeman Garment Corp., 557 F.2d 559 (6th
Cir. 1977) (NLRB appeals from an order to disclose affidavits obtained from employees dur-
ing investigation of unfair labor practice charges).
27 421 U.S. at 137-38.
28 Id. at 149 (emphasis added).
29 In Mitsubishi Electric Corp. v. Dept. of Justice, 39 Ad. L.2d (P & F) 1133 (D.D.C.
1976), the court expressed the need to weigh heavily the public interest in releasing informa-
tion. Mitsubishi made a request for certain documents in the possession of the Foreign Com-
merce Section of the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice. The agency records
were questionnaire responses to a survey of patent and know-how practices of approximately
100 U.S. corporations conducted within the past eight years. The Department of Justice
denied the request on the basis of exemptions 4 and 7(A) of the FOIA. The court ruled that
the FOIA is not for the benefit of private litigants and should not serve as a tool for discovery.
Instead, the FOIA is "fundamentally designed to inform the public about the agency action."
Id at 1141.
30 410 U.S. 73 (1973).
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public interest.3 ' This policy of encouraging maximum disclosure
often clashes with government's statutory duty to collect foreign in-
telligence and maintain secrecy to further national security interests.
B. The CIA s Statutory Duty To Collect Forezgn Intelligence
The Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor at the beginning
of World War II taught U.S. defense officials an important lesson:
national security means possessing strong intelligence-gathering ca-
pabilities. Historians point to a lack of communication between key
government officials and to a lack of centralization in the intelli-
gence-gathering process as the cause of the surprise. 32
After the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, American govern-
ment officials sought to eliminate deficiencies in the nation's intelli-
gence capabilities. Before the end of World War II, President Harry
S. Truman began reorganizing the intelligence community by issuing
Executive Order 9,621, which dissolved the Office of Strategic Serv-
ices (OSS).3 3 Intelligence matters at that time were handled by the
State and War Departments. After the rise and fall of other intelli-
gence organizational schemes, Congress in 1947 passed the National
Security Act, 34 establishing a charter for the CIA.
The National Security Act authorizes the CIA to collect and as-
sess foreign intelligence, and to advise and make recommendations to
the National Security Council.35 Other agencies, such as the Na-
tional Security Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and Drug
Enforcement Administration, collect information for the intelligence
community. 36 The Departments of State, Treasury, Energy, and De-
fense also provide intelligence.37 The Act requires the Director of
Central Intelligence to protect intelligence sources and methods.
This statutory duty is crucial because significant pieces of intelli-
31 Id. at 80. See also S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1965): "It is the purpose of
the present bill. . . to establish a general philosophy of full agency disclosure unless informa-
tion is exempted under clearly delineated statutory language."
For a general treatment on the scope of the exemptions, see Note, The Freedom oflnforma-
tion Act-The Parameters ofthe Exemptions, 62 GEo. L.J. 177, 206-07 (1973). The author con-
cludes that the exemptions are too general to provide guidance on what the agencies can
withhold.
32 See J. FLYNN, THE TRUTH ABOUT PEARL HARBOR 31-33 (1945); G. MORGENSTERN,
PEARL HARBOR, THE STORY OF THE SECRET WAR 260-63 (1947).
33 Exec. Order No. 9,621, 3 C.F.R. 431 (1945).
34 50 U.S.C. § 403 (1976).
35 50 U.S.C. § 403(d)(1)-(2) (1976).
36 Id
37 See 50 U.S.C. § 403(e) (1976). This provision gives the Director of Central Intelligence
the power to inspect the intelligence of other agencies if it relates to national security.
[December 1982)
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gence, collected secretly, are effective only when kept secret. The Act
orders the Director of Central Intelligence to protect the identity of
overseas intelligence officers and shield details of intelligence
operations. 38
The Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949,39 which more
clearly defined the agency's internal housekeeping procedures, reiter-
ated the Director's statutory duty to keep intelligence ,safe from dis-
closure. Both the CIA charter and the CIA Act serve as grounds by
which the agency can withhold information under section (b) (3) of
the FOIA.40
C. Effect of FOJA s Disclosure Poliy on the Intelligence Community
The passage of the FOIA has resulted in disclosures about the
CIA that otherwise would not have been made public. Both individ-
uals and the press have used the Act frequently to learn about past
CIA operations. For example, a reporter for the Northwestern Uni-
versity campus daily newspaper requested information under the
FOIA and then alleged that the CIA had conducted spying on the
suburban Chicago campus.41 Similarly, Syracuse University filed
suit against the CIA for its reluctance to release information on cov-
ert activities.42 In another incident, an FOIA request made by the
Los Angeles Times revealed that former Attorney General Robert F.
Kennedy had ordered the FBI to wiretap the phone calls of the late
civil rights leader, the Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.
43
" Although the disclosure of past operations does not substantially
damage the CIA, access to past operations has damaged the agency's
relationship with some foreign contacts, and has imposed burdens on
the agency's manpower. Additionally, attention has focused recently
on the impact of foreign FOIA requests on the CIA. These problems
will be considered below.
38 50 U.S.C. § 403(d)(3) (1976).
39 50 U.S.C. § 403(g) (1976).
40 Since the CIA has authority to classify information under Executive Order No. 12,356,
the information can be exempt under 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1), which exempts documents classi-
fied pursuant to executive order. Information that would release sources and methods of
intelligence would be exempt.
41 See Baksys, The CIA on Campus, The Daily Northwestern (Northwestern University),
May 25, 1979, at 1, col. 1.
42 The Syracuse New Times, June 20, 1979, at 2, col. 1.
43 See Nelson, Documents Reveal CIA Spied on Civil Rights Leader, Martin Luther King, L.A.
Times, Feb. 20, 1980, § 1, at 4, col. 1.
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1. FOIA Evaporates Foreign Contacts
The CIA's most compelling ground for relief from the FOIA
provisions is that the flow of intelligence information to the public
hampers the CIA's ability to gather information abroad. After the
intelligence is collected, the nation's security or the existence of a cov-
ert action can remain protected only if the information remains se-
cret. The United States relies heavily on intelligence from foreign
sources and from allied intelligence services.44 According to former
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, Frank C. Carlucci, the most
serious problem confronting the intelligence community is convinc-
ing foreign contacts who are unwilling to provide information to the
government that their identity will not be revealed.
45
The essential ingredient for cooperation with an allied intelli-
gence service is trust. An intelligence officer must establish a contrac-
tual relationship with a person overseas. The job is not a simple one,
as Carlucci explained to the House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence:
This is not an easy task nor is it quickly accomplished. The princi-
pal ingredient in these relationships is trust. To build a relationship
which in many cases entails putting one's life and that of one's fam-
ily in jeopardy to furnish information to the U.S. government is a
delicate and time-consuming task. Often it takes years to convince
an individual that we can protect him. Even the slightest problem
can disrupt this relationship.
46
Because most agents live in societies where government secrecy
prevails, 47 many foreign agents fail to understand the purpose of dis-
closure demanded by the FOIA. Thus, it is difficult to convince for-
eign agents that, in light of this law which makes intelligence
accessible to the public, they will never find that a U.S. newspaper or
magazine has published information they provided to the U.S.
government.
Foreign concern for protecting revelation of the source of infor-
mation has prompted some foreign intelligence services to flatly re-
fuse to provide information to the CIA and the FBI. Because of the
FOIA, the foreign agent believes that he cannot get absolute assur-
ance that nothing will be made public which could conceivably be
44 See generaly The Freedom of Information Act: Central Intelligence Ageny Exemptions, Hearings
on H.R. 5129, H.R. 7055, and H.R. 7056 Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Government
Operations, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1981) [hereinafter cited as Testimony of Carli].
45 Id.
46 Id. at 25.
47 Id.
[December 1982]
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traced back to his doorstep. In numerous cases, assurances have
failed to preserve crucial intelligence contacts.48  Regardless of
whether the intelligence community believes it can keep a secret, "in
the final analysis, it is their [foreign agents'] perception-not ours-
which counts. '49
2. Administrative Burdens Caused by the FOIA I,
The demands of public access seriously drain the CIA's man-
power. The CIA receives about 16 requests per day,50 or over 4,100
FOIA and Privacy Act requests per year. From 1975 to 1978, the
agency logged 19,889 total requests; 10,230 of these were logged
under FOIA.5' Agency officials see little relief in sight, and antici-
pate that the agency will receive some 4,000 to 5,000 requests per
year through 1983.52 Other agencies have experienced similar diffi-
culties with the public demand for information. In 1975, for exam-
ple, the Justice Department received 30,000 requests for information
under the FOIA.
5 3
In an attempt to meet this public demand, the CIA hired 65-70
persons to answer FOIA requests.5 4 Hundreds of other employees
48 Frank Carlucci told Congress:
A recent approach made to a U.S. businessman with good access to foreign military
information was initially rejected. The potential source interrogated the CIA of-
ficer at length, asked about disclosure policies, the FOIA and its requirements, CIA
responsibilities under disclosure statutes, guarantees that CIA could really protect
his information from disclosure, the effects of release by CIA of information to Con-
gress, and the ability, under the FOIA or otherwise, of his competitors to uncover
information passed to CIA by his company. An agreement was finally reached
where CIA was given limited access to one person, restricted to one very narrow
area of information. We are convinced that this man's fear of disclosure caused this
severe limitation on what might otherwise have been a considerable flow of impor-
tant intelligence information.
Over the past few years this dilemma has prompted other important U.S.
sources of information to discontinue their cooperation with U.S. intelligence.
Testimony of Carlucci, supra note 44, at 27.
49 Testimony of Carlucci, supra note 44, at 27.
50 Testimony of Carlucci, supra note 44, at 29.
51 Report on the Central Intelligence Agency's Experiences in Administering the Free-
dom of Information Act and Related Programs-Burdens and Other Problems Resulting
Therefrom 2 (unpublished internal memorandum) [hereinafter cited as CIA/FOIA Report].
In this declassified CIA memorandum, the Agency reports on how the FOIA has affected the
CIA's effort to make information available to the public.
52 Id.
53 See Lardner, Freedom of Information Act: Costil, Much Used, Washington Post, July 25,
1976, at A4, col. 1. During 1975, the Defense Department expenditures in complying with
the FOIA alone amounted to about $5.9 million. During the summer of 1975, the CIA re-
ceived 6,609 FOIA requests.
54 CIA/FOIA Report, supra note 51, at 2.
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contribute their services and time on a part-time basis to answer the
public demand for information. 55 This expenditure of manpower,
the CIA claims, has diverted the agency's attention from its foreign
intelligence-gathering duties. Although the agency might increase
the staff of the Information and Privacy Department to meet public
demand more efficiently, even a doubling of the present staff would
not immediately eliminate the backlog of requests. The CIA ques-
tions whether the FOIA process of chasing paper for those trying to
frustrate the agency results in the most beneficial use of its time. To
emphasize this problem, agency officials reported that in one inci-
dent, the CIA was forced to hire one person on a full-time basis for 17
months to handle the demands of a single requester.
56
As a result of public demand for information, the agency's cost
of public accountability increased from $1.4 million in 1975 to $2.9
million in 1978. 5 7 Other agencies in the intelligence community have
experienced even higher costs. During 1975, for example, the De-
fense Department recorded expenditures of $5.9 million alone to
comply with FOIA requests.58 In 1976 the Defense Department
spent $4.7 million and had 90 employees committed to handling
FOIA requests.5 9 In 1977, then FBI Director Clarence Kelley spent
$6.5 million to summon 400 agents to Washington, D.C. to eliminate
a backlog of FOIA requests involving some 10 million pages of mate-
rial. 60 At that time, nearly 379 persons were employed at FBI head-
quarters, researching 16,000 appeals per year at an annual cost of $9
million.
6 1
The tremendous backlog that has developed since the FOIA was
enacted further complicates the FOIA dilemma. Although the
backlog fluctuates from week to week, little progress has been made
in reducing the number of unanswered requests. For instance, dur-
ing April 1979, the CIA faced a backlog of 2,700 requests.
62
55 Id.
56 Testimony ofCarlucci, supra note 44, at 30. Frequently, authors who are writing books on
intelligence topics make several requests. Carlucci revealed that over four man-years of work
have been spent by the agency to handle the requests of Phillip Agee, a former employee who
has exposed CIA operations in his books. Id.
57 CIA/FOIA Report, supra note 51, at 2.
58 Lardner, The Freedom of Information Act: Costy, Much Used, Washington Post, July 25,
1976, at A4, col. 1.
59 Id.
60 FBI to Use 400 Agents in Efort to Clear Backlog of Inquiries About Files, N.Y. Times, Mar.
18, 1977, at All, col. 5.
61 Id.
62 Testimony of Carlucci, supra note 44, at 27. The backlog of requests fluctuates during any
given week. In April 1979, for example, Carlucci reported that the backlog was at 21,700
[December 19821
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In addition to problems of backlog, the agency faces difficulties
in meeting a ten day deadline for answering requests. The law re-
quires each agency to produce the document requested or to claim an
exemption within ten working days after it receives a letter.63 Since
requests are handled on a first-in-first-out basis, the sizeable backlog
in requests makes fulfilling this requirement virtually impossible. A
backlog produces two complications. First, because the agency's fail-
ure to reply within the deadline can be construed as a refusal of the
requester's demands,64 the requester can then file for an administra-
tive appeal. Second, the agency-in view of its backlog-can ask for
an extension for answering and handling an FOIA request. 65 If ex-
tensions are regularly granted, backlogs can only be expected to in-
crease. During January 1980, the CIA had 2,800 unanswered
requests and 300 unanswered appeals.
66
The review of documents for public disclosure requires consider-
able time. Because access to information is granted on a need-to-
know basis, files at the CIA and other branches of the intelligence
community are decentralized. Once information is retrieved, it is
then cautiously reviewed by the Information and Privacy Staff. If
the record being sought concerns foreign intelligence, for example,
each document must be reviewed by persons on at least two levels of
authority.67 If national security information is to be protected at all
costs, this review cannot be performed hastily in order to meet a stat-
utory deadline. Thus, under the present law it is difficult for the
Director of Central Intelligence to fulfill his statutory duty to protect
sources and methods of intelligence to the best of his ability. Even
when due care is applied, information can still be inadvertently re-
leased. For example, in 1978, the CIA mistakenly released a classi-
requests. According to a spokesperson for the CIA's Information and Privacy Staff, the back-
log had leveled off to 2,494 requests during the week of July 19-25, 1979. During that week,
79 new FOIA cases were begun while 53 cases were closed. Four requesters had made appeals
from the CIA's denial to release documents. Eighty-eight persons were involved in answering
and processing FOIA requests during that week.
63 See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(A)(i) (1976).
64 See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(C) (1976).
65 Id.
66 CIA/FOIA Report, supra note 51, at 2-3. But see Open America v. Watergate Special
Prosecution Force, 547 F.2d 605 (D.C. Cir. 1976). The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals said
that an agency which is deluged with a large volume of requests would be experiencing "ex-
ceptional circumstances." The court observed that this factor could allow the agency to have
additional time beyond the ten day limit imposed by § 552(a) (6)(A) (i) of the Act. 547 F.2d at
610-12.
67 CIA/FOIA Report, srupra note 51, at 2-3.
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fled report which stated that Israel had obtained nuclear weapons.68
3. Foreign Access
Requests by foreign governments have alerted the intelligence
community to the possible dangers that could result from releasing
intelligence documents to persons who may have been hostile to the
United States government. Mystery engulfs information requests be-
cause the agency does not know the requester's intent. If past secrets
are sought, the agency rarely knows how much information the re-
quester presently possesses to aid in identifying what might be a
secret.
In 1978, the agency was alerted to the dangers of foreign access
when it released a declassified secret memorandum on the Agency
and its academic relations to the librarian of the Polish embassy in
Washington, D.C. 69 This memorandum revealed details of how the
CIA should defend its relationship with the academic community.
The document recommended that the universities defend their rela-
tionship with the CIA by relating work for the agency to traditional
68 Flaika, CIA's Top Secret '"Mistake" on Israel and the Bomb, The Washington Star, Jan. 28,
1979, at 1, col. 1.
69 Agency-Academic Relations, Memorandum for R.J. Smith, Deputy Director of Intel-
ligence for the Central Intelligence Agency (Feb. 25, 1969). This secret document, which was
later declassified, was released to Margaret Romaniuk, the librarian of the Polish Embassy in
Washington, D.C., after she had sent the following letter to the Information and Privacy
Coordinator of the CIA:
AMBASADA POLSKIEJ RZECZYPOS POLITEJ LUDOWEJ W
WASZYNGTONIE
Embassy Of the Polish People's Republic







I would like to obtain on the basis of the Freedom of Information Act the memo-
randum by Earl C. Bolton entitled "Agency-Academic Relations."
I read about the memorandum in the New York Times of November 22 where it is
stated that it had been declasified [sic] early this year.
I called your Agency in November and was advised to write this letter to you in




On March 13, 1979, George W. Owens, CIA Information and Privacy Coordinator, sent a
copy of the memorandum to Ms. Romaniuk.
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university functions and "long established academic values. ' 70 The
document also stated that an apologia can best be made by "some
distant academic who is not under attack" in a "respectable" publi-
cation of general circulation. The memorandum recommended that
the CIA might wish to offer off-campus leased space to scholars doing
work for the agency.71 Another proposal in the memorandum ad-
vised scholars to use substitute phrases such as "limited access re-
search," instead of labelling classified research projects as "secret"
and "confidential" or "classified. ' 72 To improve the CIA's image,
the document urged that all recruiting be conducted off campus and
that all visits by CIA representatives be made during the summer
months, preferably after the last issue of the student paper has been
printed.7
3
The CIA was probably concerned about the librarian's ties to
the Polish government, although nothing could be done if ties ex-
isted. Under the language of the Act, Ms. Romaniuk need not even
declare her reasons for seeking the document. The CIA's concern
centered around how the Polish embassy might use the information.
The Polish government may have wished to identify a classified re-
search project at an American university. The Polish government
could not learn anything directly from the document, since any clas-
sified information would be exempted from disclosure. It is possible,
though, that the librarian was making a request on behalf of another
foreign intelligence service or was involved in a series of requests to
piece together information on aspects of CIA academic relations that
were not released in the memorandum. 74 Certainly, if the Polish gov-
ernment learned of a research project labeled "limited access re-
search," it could identify a past CIA classified research project.
70 Agency-Academic Relations 1 (Aug. 5, 1968) (unpublished CIA memorandum). This
secret document, now declassified, has deleted the name of the person for whom it was written
to protect the writer's identity. Information that is classified or which will identify sources
and methods of intelligence is also deleted, thus "sanitizing" the CIA documents released
under FOIA.
71 Id. at 3.
72 Id. at 4.
73 Id. at 6.
74 It is not clear from Ms. Romaniuk's letter exactly why she was seeking this document.
She merely expressed a general interest in the memorandum. Since the requested documents
on their face bear no relation to the Polish government, the requester may have been trying to
learn about a past CIA research project.
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D. Judicial Enforcement of Dzsclosure Policy to Intelligence Agencies. Not
in the Best Interests of Preserving Essential Secrecy
The courts have made no exceptions in applying the FOIA's dis-
closure policy to the CIA and other components of the intelligence
community. In ensuring the widest possible disclosure, the courts
have required intelligence agencies, as well as others, to release segre-
gable portions of classified documents. In Florence v. Department of De-
fense,75 the plaintiff brought an action under the FOIA to obtain
technical records produced by the Defense Documentation Center.
The records were classified as "confidential," although most of the
reports in the bulletin were actually unclassified. The Court held
that although a document may be classified according to regulations
set by Executive Order, any portion of the information which is un-
classified must be disclosed to the requester.76 The court in Florence
may have released clues about information damaging to national se-
curity by disclosing the documents that were unclassified. Even a
simple request can give a requester a hint about the nature of the
classified information, depending on what he or she may already
know about the file.
Because the Act places no restrictions on an individual's reason
for seeking a document, it is difficult for the intelligence community
to thwart the attempts of requesters who seek to learn clues about
classified information. Even when the requester's need for the infor-
mation is not legitimate, this factor still has no impact on the
agency's decision. In Baker v. CIA ,77 the plaintiff and five other CIA
employees were fired from the agency because of a "surplus" of em-
ployees. The discharged employees made an FOIA request for CIA
hiring regulations and vacancy notices. The court ruled that the re-
questers' interest and need for seeking this information was irrele-
vant, but still ordered the CIA to grant the plaintiffs the documents.
Similarly, the agencies could not deny information on the ground
that one's purpose in making the request is for espionage.
75 415 F. Supp. 156 (D.D.C. 1976).
76 Id. at 157. See also Halperin v. Department of State, 565 F.2d 699, 705-06 (D.D.C.
1977). In Halpenn, the court of appeals ruled that the lower court correctly held that deleted
portions of a transcript of a press conference, although classified confidential, could not be
exempted, because they were not properly classified under (b)(1)'s criteria. However, because
the State Department believed that releasing portions of the transcript would gravely damage
national security, the court remanded the case to the district court to determine whether the
alleged damage would be so great as to justify the extraordinary step of prohibiting the
release.
77 425 F. Supp. 633 (D.D.C. 1977), at'd, 580 F.2d 664 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
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Cooper v. Department of Navy of United States78 presents another ex-
ample of how courts enforce the FOIA's disclosure policy. An attor-
ney who represented the family of a person killed in a Marine Corps
helicopter brought an action against the Department of the Navy for
disclosure of a judge advocate general's manual investigation report
and aircraft accident safety investigation. The court declared that a
need to know is not a criterion for disclosure under the FOIA.
79 If
everyone can have the information, then anyone can as well.
III. Exemptions Generally Protect the Most Sensitive Documents
But Fail to Provide Absolute Protection
Although public access to files has damaged foreign intelligence
operations, the FOIA exemptions protect the most sensitive intelli-
gence documents. The Act's requirement that an FOIA request must
"reasonably" describe the records sought provides further relief from
blanket requests.8 0 Without this clause, government agencies would
have an even greater backlog of requests, many of which would be
impossible to fulfill. For example, the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit in Marks v. United States (Dept. ofJustice),81
denied a man's requests for all FBI files and documents maintained
under his name, stating that sweeping unspecific requests under the
FOIA are not permissible.
A. The National Security Exemption
The first exemption listed in section (b) of the FOIA says that
the Act does not apply to classified national security information.
8 2
78 558 F.2d 274 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 926 (1977). See also Renegotiation Bd. v.
Bannercraft Clothing Co., 466 F.2d 345 (D.C. Cir. 1972), rev'd, 415 U.S. 1 (1974); Mercy
Hospital, Iowa City, Iowa v. NLRB, 449 F. Supp. 594 (S.D. Iowa 1978) (hospital, denied
discovery of written statements by witnesses, not entitled to preliminary injunction enjoining
NLRB from calling those witnesses, absent showing of irreparable harm); Kanter v. IRS, 433
F. Supp. 812 (N.D. Ill. 1977) (persons indicted for conspiring to defraud the U.S. government
sought disclosure of certain documents).
79 558 F.2d at 276.
80 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(A) (1976).
81 578 F.2d 261 (9th Cir. 1978).
82 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (1976). The FOIA does not apply to matters that are: "(A) spe-
cifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the
interest of national defense or foreign policy and (B) are in fact properly classified pursuant to
such Executive order." Id. § 552(b)(1).
The basis for withholding information is Excutive Order No. 10,501, which established
three degrees of classification ("top secret," "secret," and "confidential'). This classification
much improved President Truman's Executive Order No. 10,290, which defined categories
imprecisely, delegated unrestricted authority to classify, and failed to establish classification
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The original Act passed by Congress in 1966 devoted little emphasis
to national security information. The original law exempted mate-
rial "specifically required by Executive Order to be kept secret in the
interest of national defense or foreign policy. '8 3 When the Act was
amended in 1974, the language of the (b)(1) exemption was revised;
the phrase "required to be classified by Executive Order" in the old
(b)(1) exemption was changed to information which was "author-
ized" to be classified under the criteria of an Executive Order. This
meant that if a court chose to review a classification determination,
including examination of the records in camera, the court may look at
the reasonableness or propriety of the determination to classify the
records under the terms of the Executive Order. 4 The previous lan-
guage established a standard which was applied when a document
was marked "top secret" or "confidential," according to the provi-
sions of past Executive Orders 10,501,85 11,652,86 and 12,036.7
The most recent Executive Order on classification (No. 12,356)88
sets out three categories in which documents can be classified. "Top
secret" classification applies to information that, if released, could be
expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to national security.89
"Secret" classification applies to information that could reasonably
procedures. As a result of Truman's order, much information was classified, and declassifica-
tion rarely occured. See Note, National Security Information Under the Amended Freedom of Informa-
tion Act: Historical Perspectives and Anaosis, 4 HOFSTRA L. REV. 759, 765-66 & n.38 (1976).
The President derives his exclusive control over foreign affairs matters by authority of
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936). See Note, Executive Privi-
lege and the Freedom of Information Act: The Constitutional Foundation of the Amended National Security
Exemption, 1976 WASH. U.L.Q. 609, 637-45 (Presidential powers over national security infor-
mation and related matters). For a discussion of Executive Order No. 11,652, the predecessor
of Executive Order No. 12,065, see Note, National Security and the Amended Freedom of Information
Act, 85 YALE L.J. 401, 407-22 (1976).
83 Act of July 4, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250 (1966).
84 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 6267, 6273; Attorney General's 1974 FOIA
Amendments Memorandum, at 1. In EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 81 (1973), the court ruled
that subsection (b)(1) exempts materials specifically required by Executive Order to be kept
secret and that classification of material under Executive Order is sufficient to protect docu-
ments from disclosure. At the time of the Mink case, the classification procedures were gov-
erned by Executive Order. Executive Order No. 10,501, 3 C.F.R. 280 (1970), was superseded
by Executive Order No. 11,652, 3 C.F.R. 375 (1973).
85 Exec. Order No. 10,501, 3 C.F.R. 280 (1970).
86 Exec. Order No. 11,652, 3 C.F.R. 375 (1973).
87 Exec. Order No. 12,036, 3 C.F.R. 112 (1979).
88 Exec. Order No. 12,356, 47 Fed. Reg. 14,874 (1982). This Executive Order by Presi-
dent Reagan on April 2, 1982, replaced Executive Order No. 12,065. This new order did not
alter the definitions of "top secret," "secret," and "confidential."
89 47 Fed. Reg. at 14,874.
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be expected to cause serious damage to the national security.90
"Confidential" classification applies to information that could be ex-
pected to cause identifiable damage to national security.91
Section 1.3 of this Executive Order provides guidance for the
intelligence community on what can and cannot be considered for
classification. Information cannot be classified unless it involves: (a)
military plans, weapons or operations; (b) foreign government infor-
mation; (c) intelligence activities, sources or methods; (d) foreign
relations or foreign activities of the United States; or (e) scientific,
technological, or economic matters relating to the national security.
92
Information received from a foreign intelligence service can also be
protected by the (b)(1) exemption.
Executive Order 10,501 enabled the government to successfully
withhold sensitive information. In Epste'n v. Resor,93 the Department
of the Army refused a Stanford University historian's request to re-
lease documents concerning the forcible repatriation of displaced So-
viet citizens. The document was classified as "top secret" under
Executive Order 10,501. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals af-
firmed the Army's refusal.94 In Maroscia v. Levi, 95 details about CIA
operations classified as "secret" under provisions of Executive Order
11,652 were exempt from disclosure because the documents would
name the foreign country and would identify the foreign intelligence
sources. Executive Orders have been instrumental in refusing FOIA
90 Id. at § 1.1(a)(2).
91 Id. at § 1.1(a)(3).
92 Id. at § 1.3(a)(1)-(6).
93 296 F. Supp. 214 (N.D. Cal. 1969), aj'd, 421 F.2d 930 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S.
965 (1970).
94 421 F.2d 930, 933 (9th Cir. 1970). For further discussion of this decision, see Epstein,
Epstein v. Resor or the Emasculation of the Freedom of Information Act, 7 LINCOLN L. REV. 82
(1971). In its amicus curiae brief, the ACLU objected to the Army's decision to keep the
document, arguing, "The judgment must be reversed because the trial court applied an unau-
thorized and overly restrictive test of judicial review of an agency's claim of exemption and
failed to discharge statutory responsibility to determine whether the records requested were
improperly withheld." Id at 95. The brief strongly rejected the Army's claim of the exemp-
tion. See also Recent Cases, File Classiftd "Top Secret" Is Within National Scurity Exemptionfrom
the Act and Is Not Obtainable Unless the Classifration Is Arbitraqr and Unreasonable, 83 HARV. L.
REv. 928 (1970).
95 569 F.2d 1000 (7th Cir. 1977). The plaintiff in this case requested all FBI files con-
cerning himself. After some correspondence, FBI Director Clarence Kelley informed the
plaintiff that his request had been completed. One document that had originated with the
CIA but was in the FBI's possession was withheld.
In Lesar v. Department ofJustice, 455 F. Supp. 921 (D.D.C. 1978), materials on Martin
Luther King's assassination classified in strict compliance with Executive Order No. 11,652 to
protect the identity of confidential sources were exempt from disclosure.
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demands for CIA financial records96 and Department of Defense esti-
mates of Soviet naval force levels. 97 In Aspin v. Department of Defense ,98
the court ruled that past release of confidential information does not
bind the executive branch if further release would jeopardize na-
tional security.
The court in Ray v. Turner99 underscored section (b)(1)'s applica-
bility to information regarding the CIA's relationship with a foreign
intelligence service. The plaintiff brought a suit under the FOIA and
demanded that the agency disclose CIA documents concerning him
and others. The court held that if the information in the documents
originates from or reveals a relationship with a foreign intelligence
organization, the documents fall within the (b)(1) exemption of the
FOIA. Although the information from the foreign intelligence serv-
ice was not specifically classified by Executive Order 12,065, it could
still be exempted under part (a) of section (b)(1). t00
1. Shortcomings of the (b)(1) Exemption in Ensuring Secrecy
Despite section (b)(1)'s ability to protect information which
clearly qualifies as national security information, the exemption does
not always guarantee that the information will be kept secret. First,
an inability to comply with the procedural criteria' 0 ' of Executive
Order 1,256 could result in the disclosure of classified information.
Although some courts are reluctant to release an agency's documents
merely because the agency failed to comply with the procedural for-
malities, one judge suggested that release is appropriate when for-
malities of the exemption process are not satisfied.'0 2 In Ayred A.
Knopf Inc. v. Colby,' 0 3 for example, the Fourth Circuit did not hesitate
to release documents which failed to meet the classification proce-
dures spelled out by the Executive Order. In this suit by a publisher
against the CIA, the court decided that the classifications given to
96 Richardson v. Spahr, 416 F. Supp. 752, 753 (W.D. Pa. 1976).
97 Aspin v. Department of Justice, 453 F. Supp. 520, 522 (E.D. Wis. 1978).
98 Id. at 524. In another FOIA request made to the Department of Defense by Les As-
pin, the issue was whether the Secretary of the Army should release a report entitled "Depart-
ment of the Army Review of the Preliminary Investigation into the My Lai Incident." This
information was not released. Aspin v. Department of Defense, 491 F.2d 24 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
99 468 F. Supp. 730 (D.D.C. 1979).
100 Id. at 734.
101 See Exec. Order No. 12,356, 47 Fed. Reg. 14,874, at §§ 1.3-1.6, 2.1-2.2, & 3.1-3.4
(1982). These procedural requirements cover such matters as the authority and identification
of the classifier, the duration of the classification, the marking of classified material, the segre-
gability of nonclassified information, and the period of declassification.
102 See Lesar v. Department of Justice, 636 F.2d 472, 485 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
103 509 F.2d 1362 (4th Cir. 1975).
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certain portions of information were made in an ad hoc fashion, and
not by a classifying officer as required by the Executive Order. The
documents, nevertheless, were released.10 4 A mistake in the classifica-
tion process could conceivably lead to the release of information
which justifiably could be exempt under section (b)(1).
Second, the Freedom of Information Act places the burden on
the agency to prove that section (b)(1) applies to the information
sought to be withheld. 0 5 To meet this burden, the agency must sub-
mit an affidavit 10 6 proving that proper classification procedures were
followed, 0 7 that the document logically falls within the exemp-
tion, 10 8 and that unclassified or segregable portions can be re-
leased.' 0 9 Meeting these criteria is not always an easy task. An
intelligence document may be so sensitive that the agency cannot
explain why it is exempt. Although in camera review can be made
available, the information may be too sensitive for the court to re-
view. Sometimes to even suggest that a document exists may reveal
or give clues about sources and methods of intelligence.'t0 The
agency alternatively can avoid in camera inspection and plead for a
ruling on the affidavits submitted. In this situation, however, the
agency has an implied burden to show that the information logically
meets the criteria of the exemption. If the agency fails to do so, the
information can be released.
In Hayden v. National Security Ageng,111 the D.C. Circuit granted
substantial relief to intelligence agencies. The requester in Haden
had sought details about electromagnetic signals which had been
monitored by the NSA. In preparing a Vaughn index, the NSA failed
to provide the required itemization of documents and detailed justifi-
104 Id. at 1367.
105 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (1976).
106 See Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820, 826-28 (D.C. Cir. 1973). In this case, the District
of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals suggested a standard affidavit format and index system
for agencies to use in describing whether information or documents requested should be ex-
empt. The court recommended that the affidavit should be specific by using cross-references
to the relevant portion of information. The court also recommended that the affidavit be
itemized and indexed. Id.
107 See, e.g., Allen v. CIA, 636 F.2d 1287, 1292-93 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (affidavit submitted by
the agency did not reveal the classification officer).
108 Id.
109 SUBCOMM. ON ADM. PRAC. & PROC. OF THE SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY,
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION SOURCE BOOK; LEGISLATIVE MATERIALS, CASES, ARTICLES, S.
Doc. No. 9382, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 226 (Comm. Print 1974).
110 In cases where an intelligence source could be obtained only by one means or by one
person, revealing that the document is in the government's hands may reveal the person
involved in the mission or the method used to secure it.
111 608 F.2d 1381 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
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cation for nondisclosure. The court observed that an itemization of
the NSA's signal intelligence operations could reveal the substantive
content of the messages and could help identify the communications
intercepted by the agency. Because of the NSA's unique mission in
collecting signals intelligence, the secrecy interests outweighed the
public's right to know. The court concluded that the NSA provided
a sufficient index by stating generally what the documents were used
for under the Vaughn standard." 2 Under Hayden, therefore, an intel-
ligence agency need not provide all the details about the classified
documents. The agency should, however, include at least some evi-
dence that detailed disclosure might damage national security
interests.
B. Third Exemption Serves as an Efective Shield
The (b) (3) exemption states that the FOIA does not require dis-
closure of matters that are exempted by a withholding statute." 
3
Generally, a withholding statute authorizes or requires withholding
information from public disclosure if the information fits the statu-
tory criteria.' '4 Under this exemption, the government has the bur-
den of proving that the requested information should be properly
withheld. "15
The CIA cites its charter, the National Security Act of 1947, as
its authority for withholding information. The National Security
Act states "[t]hat the Director of Central Intelligence shall be respon-
sible for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthor-
ized disclosure."'1 6 In Philhippi v. CZA,11 7 the court said that this
112 Id. at 1385.
113 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (1976). The statute does not require the release of information
that is "specifically exempted from disclosure by statute. . . , provided that such statute (A)
requires that the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discre-
tion on the issue, or (B) establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular
types of matters to be withheld."
114 See note 116 infta.
115 See, e.g., Irons v. Gottschalk, 548 F.2d 992, 995-96 (D.C. Cir. 1976). See also Weissman
v. CIA, 565 F.2d 692 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (political activist sought access to files on himself);
Phillippi v. CIA, 546 F.2d 1009 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (journalist sought dislosure of CIA records
on contact with media about purported spy ship); Cerveny v. CIA, 445 F. Supp. 772 (D. Colo.
1978) (conservator of absentee estate sought information from CIA on whereabouts of the
person); Founding Church of Scientology of Washington, Inc. v. National Sec. Agency, 434
F. Supp. 632 (D.D.C. 1977) (religious organization sought information from the National
Security Agency on the church and its founder); Marks v. CIA, 426 F. Supp. 708 (D.D.C.
1976) (former State Department employee sought CIA files on himself).
116 50 U.S.C. § 403(d)(3) (1976). The CIA also cites the CIA Act of 1949 as a withholding
statute. See note 5 supra. If an agency can show that disclosure would violate a particular
federal statute, the information is exempt from disclosure under the FOIA. See Shermco In-
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withholding statute placed a burden on the CIA to show that the
release of the information could reasonably be expected to lead to
unauthorized disclosure of intelligence sources and methods.
The CIA has successfully used the third exemption to prevent
the disclosure of information which could reveal sources and methods
of intelligence. A district court, for example, recognized that disclo-
sure of information provided to the CIA by a Communist insurgency
group might reveal the agency's intelligence source, and prevented
the disclosure of this information under section (b)(3).118 Details
about the CIA's financial arrangements were also withheld under
this exemption." 9 The exemption also prevented a church from ob-
taining details about a CIA investigation into its relationship with a
foreign government, for disclosure of such information would risk re-
vealing sources and methods of intelligence.' 20
CIA relationships with individuals who support or assist in the
agency's intelligence-gathering operations have been protected by
the (b)(3) exemption. In Halperin v. CIA,121 the plaintiff requested
CIA documents detailing legal bills and fee arrangements with pri-
vate attorneys retained by the agency. The district court rejected
Halperin's demands, and the court of appeals affirmed. The D.C.
Circuit pointed to three reasons for withholding this information.
First, the court observed that the disclosure of legal bills might sub-
ject the attorney to hostile action by a foreign power, embarrass the
U.S. government, and jeopardize relations with foreign states.
122
Second, identifying an attorney who is working under contract with
the CIA might discourage others who would wish to have their rela-
tionship remain confidential from seeking employment with the
dus. v. Secretary of the U.S. Air Force, 452 F. Supp. 306, 323 (N.D. Tex. 1978), rev'don other
groundr, 613 F.2d 1314 (5th Cir. 1980). There are over 100 statutes enacted by Congress that
allow or require agencies to withhold information. Other (b)(3) statutes include:
(a) 42 U.S.C. §§ 20006-5(b), 2000e-8(e) (1976), directing EEOC to keep informa-
tion based on charges of employment discrimination secret prior to the initiation of
a formal proceeding.
(b) 49 U.S.C. § 1461 (1976), directing the Civil Aeronautics Board to keep deci-
sions on foreign routes secret until submitted to the President.
(c) 42 U.S.C. §§ 2161-2166 (1976), relating to atomic energy.
117 546 F.2d 1009, 1015 n.14 (D.C. Cir. 1976). The information in this case was classifia-
ble under (b)(1) of the Act.
118 Ferry v. CIA, 438 F. Supp. 664, 669 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
119 Richardson v. Spahr, 416 F. Supp. 752, 753-54 (W.D. Pa.), afd, 547 F.2d 1163 (3d
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 830 (1977).
120 Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. CIA, 458 F. Supp. 798, 802 (D.D.C. 1978).
121 629 F.2d 144 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
122 Id. at 148.
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agency.1 23 Finally, the court said that revealing the lawyer's identity
could disclose details about the particular operation. 12 4 The court
recognized that a lawyer's life could be endangered by disclosing his
or her name.
Since domestic organizations frequently provide information to
the CIA, courts have protected documents concerning the agency's
relationship with domestic organizations. In Gardes v. CIA ,125 the
court denied disclosure of documents which contained details about
the CIA's relationship with the University of California, since disclo-
sure could reveal the identity of contacts that the agency maintained
on the university campuses.' 26 Similarly, the Ninth Circuit ex-
empted from disclosure documents concerning the agency's relation-
ship with the International Criminal Police Organization because
disclosure could "reasonably be expected to lead to unauthorized dis-
closure of intelligence sources [or] methods."
1 27
The (b) (3) exemption will not serve as a carte blanche to exempt
all documents the CIA wishes to protect. In Naask/ v. CIA,128 the
court refused to protect authors, publishers, and books connected
with an agency clandestine book publishing operation. 29 The court
recognized that these authors and books could not be classified as
intelligence sources and methods under section 403(d)(3), the CIA's
withholding provision, since they only assisted in producing the final
intelligence product. 130 If the information cannot be classified as an
intelligence source or method, the CIA cannot exempt the informa-
tion under section 403(d)(3).
IV. Search For A Compromise Between Secrecy And Openness
A. Why Restricting the Requesters' Powers Fails to Cure the Problem
When searching for a solution to the problem of protecting intel-
ligence, two fundamental approaches come to mind: requiring a
need to know and limiting access to U.S. citizens. On the surface, a
need-to-know requirement could prevent those who do not have any
123 Id. at 149.
124 Id.
125 484 F. Supp. 368 (D.D.C.), remanded, 637 F.2d 770 (D.C. Cir. 1980), on remand, 510 F.
Supp. 977 (D.D.C. 1981) (summary judgment granted).
126 484 F. Supp. at 371.
127 National Comm'n on Law Enforcement & Social Justice v. CIA, 576 F.2d 1373, 1377
(9th Cir. 1978).
128 499 F. Supp. 269 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
129 Id. at 275.
130 Id.
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legitimate use for information from having access to it. To prevent
foreign nationals from having access to intelligence documents, the
simple solution might be to prohibit foreigners from making requests
under the Act. With either approach, however, certain factors would
render policing these practices virtually impossible.
1. A Need-To-Know Requirement
Because the requester need not state reasons for seeking a docu-
ment under the FOIA1 3 t and because any person can make a request,
the transformation of an intelligence document from government in-
formation to public information might cause unknown adverse ef-
fects to our nation's security. Requiring a need to possess the
document will arguably enable the intelligence organization to 'de-
tect more easily when the requester has hostile intentions and to re-
fuse to disclose the document. Possible guidelines to determine
whether the requester had a need to know include first, whether the
person seeking the information has any relation to the document he
is seeking, and second, whether the information will be useful to the
person in his work or research.
It would be difficult, if not impossible, to enforce a need-to-know
prerequisite to obtaining information under the FOIA. First, if a re-
quester had no legitimate reason to request a certain document, he or
she could devise a fictitious reason for seeking the document. Sec-
ond, a need-to-know restriction would be repugnant to the FOIA's
policy of disclosure. It would be a misnomer to refer to a "Freedom
of Information Act" that allows the requester to have only that infor-
mation that he needs to know. Third, it is difficult to determine
what the requester should know. For the government to make that
determination would amount to state control of information. The
courts have traditionally denounced such government control of
public information.
132
2. Narrow Interpretation of "Any Person"
An alternate tactic now being considered to protect intelligence
involves limiting access under the FOIA to U.S. citizens. In drafting
and adopting the FOIA, Congress never addressed the citizenship of
the requester.
Restricting the definition of any person to "any citizen" would
131 The FOIA does not require justifying reasons for a request. Section (a)(3) of the Act
says that information will be disclosed "upon any request."
132 See, e.g., Miami Herald v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
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not successfully alleviate the agency's burden or thwart attempts by
foreign intelligence services to gather clues about past intelligence
operations. If the law were reworded to exclude aliens from making
requests, a foreign national could get an American citizen to make
the request. Officials in the intelligence community believe that
some intelligence services already use this practice.1 33 Additionally,
once information enters the public domain, it can be made available
to all who request it, regardless of whether it is requested by an
American journalist or a Soviet Intelligence officer. Even if the law
imposed a criminal penalty to restrict requesters from giving infor-
mation to foreigners, the penalty would be impossible to enforce be-
cause information is so freely disseminated in American society.
B. The CIA's Proposed Remedy
The most desirable option sought ly the CIA is to completely
exempt the agency from the public's demands except to allow per-
sons to seek information about themselves in intelligence files. The
House of Representatives attempted to mold the agency's lobbying
efforts into law three years ago. In 1979, the House drafted H.R.
5129,134 a proposal "to enhance the foreign intelligence and law en-
forcement activities of the U.S. by improving the protection of infor-
mation necessary to their effective operation." This bill attempted to
restrict the information released to the public through the Act's
(b) (3) withholding exemption. 135 Since the CIA Act of 1949 qualifies
as a withholding statute within the meaning of the (b) (3) exemption,
the House proposed to amend the CIA Act to include other sensitive
documents, to define more clearly the meaning of intelligence sources
and methods,1 36 and to exempt the agency from the provisions of the
FOIA except in cases where someone was requesting data about him-
self or herself.1
37
In January 1980, Sen. Daniel P. Moynihan introduced the Intel-
ligence Reform Act of 1980,138 S. 2216, the Senate's legislative effort
to support the CIA's proposal. This bill sought to exempt the agency
from any law requiring it to disclose information relating to the pub-
133 See genera ly Testimony of Carlucci, supra note 44, at 25-29.
134 H.R. 5129, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. (1979). This bill was introduced in the House of
Representatives on Aug. 2, 1979, by Rep. Robert McClory (R-Ill.) and was referred to the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on Government Operations.
135 H.R. 5129, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. Ric. H7201 (1979).
136 Id.
137 Id.
138 Se 126 CONG. REc. S239 (daily ed. Jan. 24, 1980) (remarks of Sen. Moynihan).
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lication or disclosure of the organization, functions, names, official
titles, salaries, or number of personnel employed by the Agency.
39
The bill granted the Director of Central Intelligence authority to ex-
empt any intelligence component of the U.S. government from the
provisions of any law which require "publication or disclosure, or the
search or review in connection therewith" if these files concern sensi-
tive information, counterintelligence, data regarding the collection of
foreign intelligence, or information from a foreign government.
140
This bill, like H.R. 5129, allowed American citizens and permanent
resident aliens to request information concerning themselves.' 4 '
The CIA's approach offers some advantages. Because the bill
limits requesters to only those persons seeking information about
themselves, the bill excludes hundreds of requests for information
about any imaginable subject unrelated to the requester. The bill
would deter many persons from making a request. Unless they had
been employed by the agency or had knowledge that the agency had
conducted surveillance of them, many potential requesters would re-
alize that they probably would not be the subject of any given intel-
ligence file.
Cutback in public access would aid in convincing informants
and allied intelligence services that the intelligence community can
keep a secret. Since the only requesters would be those who are the
subject of the file, it is less likely that these requesters would be work-
ing from a tip given by a foreign intelligence officer. With only a
minimal disclosure of information, the chance of an inadvertent re-
lease of sensitive documents decreases.
The CIA's approach, while best protecting against the release of
classified information, fails to provide adequate accountability to the
public. Though there is a need for secrecy in the intelligence com-
munity, the public will still demand a means of being informed
about the activities of the CIA and other intelligence organizations.
Accountability can arguably be provided effectively by the Congress,
the branch of government closest to the intelligence community's ac-
tivities. Currently, most covert intelligence activities must be ap-
proved by two congressional committees. Further oversight is
provided by the President and by the National Security Council.
Despite benefits to the CIA, it is doubtful whether Congress will ac-
cept a sweeping solution that eliminates public accountability. The
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CIA's approach would thwart the purpose of the FOIA, and there
exists no evidence that the public wishes to give up the access af-
forded by the Act.
C. Recent Eforts Under the Reagan Admnistration to Provide Relief
The 97th Congress has taken action to reduce the administrative
burdens that most agencies face in complying with the FOIA. In S.
1730,142 the Senate proposed to require agencies to promulgate rules
that would impose fees for the search of documents or records by
agency personnel.1 43 The initial draft of the bill stated that a fee
would not be charged for a request or series of requests that did not
require more than two hours of agency work to process. 144 The bill
also stated that "reasonable" charges shall be imposed for the services
of agency personnel who process a request. 145 By imposing a fee, the
Senate seeks to deter duplicative requests and multiple requests made
simply to harass an agency. The bill states that if a request is made
for items already in the public domain, such as news articles or court
records, the agency will not be required to copy that record for the
requester. 146 Instead, the agency need only identify the portion of
the record by date and source. 147 Additionally, the bill would re-
quire a requester to state the number of requests he or she has made
under the FOIA within the past two years. 148 If the person has made
successive or multiple requests within that period, the agency would
not be required to copy the document, but could merely provide up-
dated information on the requested subject.
Although Congress addressed the CIA's concern for preventing
the loss of foreign contacts, Congress failed to provide the kind of
relief the agency had been seeking. S. 1730 rejected the CIA's lobby-
ing efforts to exclude the agency from the provisions of the FOIA, as
proposed in H.R. 4219 and S. 2216. S. 1730 failed to incorporate any
sweeping modifications to the FOIA. Instead, the bill put more relief
into the agency's hands by expanding its classification authority
under Executive Order 12,356.149 This new Executive Order allows
142 S. 1730, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
143 Id. at § 2.
144 Id. at § 2(a).
145 Id. at § 2(b).
146 Id. at § 4(7).
147 Id.
148 Id. at § 4(8).
149 47 Fed. Reg. 14,874 (1982). Ste also Shribman, Panel Sets Aside Plan to Weaken Informa-
lion Act, N.Y. Times, May 21, 1982, at A1, col. 1. The author notes here that the administra-
tion did not include the agency's proposal to exclude the CIA from the FOIA. Instead, the
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the President, agency heads and officials designated by the President
in the Federal Register, and officials with top secret classification au-
thority to classify information. 150 The order thus allows the CIA di-
rector to classify documents, since the CIA director is appointed by
the President. The order further allows the agency head to delegate
classification authority to other officials. t 51
The Senate proposals address the administrative burdens caused
by releasing information. A requester who wishes to make duplica-
tive requests would have to weigh the cost of making unnecessary
requests. This approach may not prevent duplicative requests en-
tirely. If a person has made a number of requests within the two-
year period mentioned in the bill, he or she could use some simple
tactics to appear as a first-time requester seeking information from a
given agency. One could, for example, change his name or address,
have a family member make another request, or use friends to make
duplicative or several requests on a given subject. Despite this short-
coming, the Senate proposal is a step in the right direction in reduc-
ing the agencies' burdens.
Despite recognizable advantages, increasing the CIA's classifica-
tion authority may not solve the problem of protecting information
provided by a foreign contact. Delegating the power to classify docu-
ments to other agency heads may permit them to make judgments on
what should and should not be classified. However, once that infor-
mation is classified and is requested under the Act, the agency's re-
fusal to provide the requested information could still be challenged
and disputed in litigation. This possibility is precisely the risk that
foreign agents and allied intelligence services wish to avoid when pro-
viding the CIA with intelligence. 52
Although Congress intends to reduce the administrative burdens
that agencies have faced, the problem of preserving important intelli-
gence contacts still remains. In order to be acceptable to the public
and to the intelligence community, any proposal must guarantee that
information provided will not be disclosed, while still allowing for
public accountability. An approach which has the potential to offer
this compromise will be considered below.
applicability of the Act could be restricted by the classification order which makes it easier for
government officials to keep national security information secret.
150 47 Fed. Reg. at 14,875.
151 Id.
152 See note 48 supra and accompanying text.
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D. A Proposal-A Lzinited Exemption for Information Provided by a
Forezgn Contact
In order to achieve a compromise between the competing inter-
ests of secrecy and openness, a proposed amendment to the FOIA
must exempt information provided by a foreign government from
the provisions of the Act. The amendment would exclude this infor-
mation not only from public disclosure, but also eliminate the
agency's duty to even search for information provided by a foreign gov-
ernment. *This approach still allows the public to have access to
other unclassified materials and information that does not fall within
the exemptions. An absolute prohibition on public access to intelli-
gence provided by foreign contacts should convince foreign contacts
that the provided information will not be leaked. The proposed
amendment would require repealing the FOIA only with respect to
foreign providers.
Not all intelligence collected by the agency comes from foreign
agents. Much of the intelligence collected by the agency is derived
from open sources such as magazines or newspapers, which are also
available to the public. Under the proposal, information contained
in agency documents which does not come from a foreign intelligence
agency would still be subject to the Act. Thus, total accountability
will not be eliminated by denying the public access to information
from allied intelligence services or foreign contacts.
The proposal to exempt information provided by a foreign con-
tact could be incorporated into practice by amending the (b)(1) or
the (b)(3) exemption. The (b)(1) exemption could be amended if
other agencies in the intelligence community which have classifica-
tion authority besides the CIA need similar relief. The exemption
could read as follows:
(b) This section does not apply to matters that are-
(1)(A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an
Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense
or foreign policy and (B) are in fact properly classified pursuant to
such Executive order. Where the zformation authorized to be kept secret is
provided by aforeign government or intelligence source orforeign agent, Section
552 of this Title will not be applicable to this information, and the agency
will be relieved of its duty to search for the iformation.
Another alternative would be to amend the CIA Act of 1949,15 3
a provision used as a withholding statute under the (b) (3) exemption.
Since the CIA's withholding provision permits the Director of Cen-
153 50 U.S.C. § 403(g) (1976).
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tral Intelligence to protect sources and methods of intelligence, this
provision can be amended to exempt from the FOIA information
provided by a foreign source under a promise of confidentiality.
In the interests of the security of the foreign intelligence activities of
the United States and in order further to implement the proviso of
section 403(d)(3) of this title that the Director of Central Intelli-
gence shall be responsible for protecting intelligence sources and
methods from unauthorized disclosure, the Agency shall be ex-
empted from the provisions of section 654 of Title 5, and the provi-
sions of any other law which require the publication or disclosure of
the organization, functions, names, official titles, salaries, or num-
bers of personnel employed by the Agency: Provided, The Agency, fur-
thermore, will be exempted from the provisions of section 552 of Title 5
requiring the disclosure of information, names and the like if such information
is provided by aforeign intelligence agency, informant orforeign agent.
Both proposals can effectively shield information provided by a
foreign source from any possibility of disclosure. If, beyond exempt-
ing the information from the requester's demands, the information is
exempted from the FOIA process, there would be no risk of disclo-
sure. Such an exemption would convince the provider that the infor-
mation would not be released under the Act, for the language
explicitly excludes information provided by a foreign source from
public disclosure or even from consideration for review.
The revised exemptions could require monitoring to prevent the
agency from exploiting loopholes to withhold information that was
not intended to be protected. Since this proposal will exempt the
information and excuse the agency's duty to search for the docu-
ment, the agency could filter other types of information that did not
originate from a foreign contact to qualify for exemption. Addition-
ally, the information provided by a foreign source could be incorpo-
rated into a document, cable, or intelligence report that also contains
information from another independent source. The agency faces the
question of whether the information that is not derived from a for-
eign source should be segregated and released, or whether it should
not be released to preserve absolute assurance to the provider that
the information will remain secret.
These problems and others can be handled by an internal sys-
tem of review to ensure that information from foreign sources is not
unnecessarily restricted. The agency could implement additional in-
ternal review procedures to more carefully check the information
withheld from the public as well as screen the documents which are
being released. This review would be most pertinent to those docu-
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ments which, on the surface, appear to be segregable from a classified
document.1 54 An internal tribunal may be established to review doc-
uments that may be damaging to national security. A similar review
process, independent of the federal courts, has been adopted by the
Department of Justice with its Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court.155 The review court could be staffed by experienced and im-
partial judges who are experts on assessing national security implica-
tions of releasing certain kinds of information. By incorporating
specialists on classification matters, the chances of error in judging
whether information is or is not classified would be greatly reduced.
Specialists could render an accurate and expert judgment about the
national security implications of disclosing certain types of informa-
tion to the public. Review by qualified specialists could eliminate
the concerns of having a judge review information which is too sensi-
tive even to view in camera.
IV. Conclusion
The clash of statutory duties under the Freedom of Information
Act and the National Security Act of 1947 has created a dilemma in
a somewhat weakened intelligence process. Finding the proper bal-
ance between the public's need for access to information and the
CIA's duty to protect sources of intelligence is not an easy task.
However, swift action should be taken to protect foreign government
information provided to the agency. Without protecting the rela-
tionship between providers and agency from public disclosure, the
quality of intelligence provided by these sources will continue to de-
cline and will affect the agency's statutory duty to collect foreign
intelligence.
The provision proposed in this article' 5 6 could strike an effective
balance because it restricts only information that is provided by a
reluctant informer, while still allowing the public to review docu-
ments that are not damaging to national security. Problems such as
access by foreign requesters and backlogs of requests should continue
to be recognized and constructively analyzed. A comprehensive solu-
tion which protects the CIA's statutory duty to collect foreign intelli-
154 See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1976): "Any reasonably segregable portion of a record shall be
provided to any person requesting such record after deletion of the portions which are exempt
under this subsection."
155 See L.A. Times, Mar. 20, 1982, § I, at 1, col. 1. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court was instituted as an "extra-judicial" device to determine whether requests for wiretaps
by agencies such as the FBI violated federal law.
156 See notes 153-55 supra and accompanying text.
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gence but also preserves public accountability will ultimately
strengthen the CIA's foreign intelligence mission.
